What is the current status of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz?
On 16 September only three commercial vessels transited the strait compared with 125 before the conflict began. The sharp drop followed repeated Iranian threats and strikes near the waterway. On the same day US President Donald Trump stated he hoped the war with Iran was nearing its end. Since early September the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had struck or attempted strikes on US targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq while also targeting US warships and commercial vessels near the Strait of Hormuz. Data compiled by Shell and reported by Reuters on 17 September showed that LNG exports from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates had already fallen by approximately 36 million tonnes in 2026 because of the restrictions. Saudi Arabia faces additional pressure from the west as Houthi forces advance along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, seizing territory and islands near Bab el Mandeb. Sinkaya states that the present situation is unacceptable to the United States and other Arab Gulf states. The future course of the war appears to hinge on developments around the Strait of Hormuz. Without a peaceful resolution a new military coalition could seek to curtail Tehran’s ability to control the waterway.
How does the IRGC maintain its deterrence posture?
Bayram Sinkaya, assistant professor of international relations at Ankara’s Yıldırım Beyazıt University, argues that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has preserved its core deterrent capacity. Despite losses of senior commanders, the organisation retains the ability to close the strait and to strike targets inside Israel and at US bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq. Sinkaya states that these demonstrated capabilities have reinforced rather than weakened the IRGC’s position inside Iran. The so-called axis of resistance continues to exist despite heavy blows, with the exception of Syria, the weakest link in the chain. Although top IRGC officials were killed during the strikes, the Guards maintained institutional cohesion and ideological positions. Therefore one cannot speak of failure of the deterrence doctrine, since it forced the Americans and Israelis to halt further strikes against Iran. In domestic politics the IRGC holds the upper hand in control. The Guards have shown their ability to protect the regime and have expanded their hold over the country for security reasons.
Internal power balance inside Iran
The same institutional cohesion has allowed the Guards to expand their domestic security role. Sinkaya observes that the IRGC has used the conflict to tighten its grip on internal security and to present itself as the protector of the regime. Senior commanders were lost yet the organisation retained its structure and ideological stance, enabling it to demonstrate protection of the regime and to widen its authority over the country on security grounds. This consolidation occurred even as external strikes continued, reinforcing the Guards’ claim to be the central pillar safeguarding the system from collapse.
Which side appears strategically stronger, Iran or Israel?
Sinkaya presents a mixed assessment. Israel has reduced the operational reach of Hamas and Hezbollah and ended Iranian influence in Syria, yet it has also exposed its vulnerability to long-range Iranian missiles. Public perception of Israel has deteriorated in several regional capitals, producing a degree of diplomatic isolation. Iran, for its part, has shown it can impose costs on Israel and the United States, but its insistence on Lebanese inclusion in any ceasefire and its claims of sovereignty over the strait leave it open to further military and economic pressure. Iran also faces significant internal challenges intensified by the war. If Israel launches another strong air campaign against Iran, previous US-Israeli strikes did not eliminate Iran’s capacity to retaliate. Today Iran still retains most of its ability to strike back at Israel. Thus beyond surface appearances both Israel and Iran have been weakened in the medium term.
Why does Tehran view Ankara with increasing suspicion?
Although Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei described ties with Turkey as “special” on 14 September, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan the following day called for unrestricted navigation through the strait and a return to pre-war conditions. Sinkaya explains that closer Turkish-US security cooperation fuels Iranian distrust. Tehran regards Turkey as an ambitious regional actor seeking greater influence in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Iranian technocrats nevertheless continue to keep diplomatic channels open in order to preserve Turkish neutrality and to obtain limited practical benefits.
How is the Greece-Israel defence agreement affecting Turkish calculations?
The 31 August agreement worth roughly three billion euros for the “Shield of Achilles” air-defence system has heightened Ankara’s concerns. Sinkaya notes that Turkey already feels pressure from Greek-Israeli military cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean and now sees the new deal as an additional constraint on its freedom of movement, especially at a time of heightened hostility between the Netanyahu government and Ankara. Turkey seeks to safeguard the rights of Turkish Cypriots and its freedom of action in the eastern Mediterranean. Consequently the strengthening of military ties between Greece and Israel has led to increased suspicions and concerns on the part of Turkey toward Greece.
Frequently asked questions
Has the IRGC’s deterrence doctrine failed?
Sinkaya maintains that the doctrine has not failed. The organisation’s demonstrated ability to threaten the strait and to reach distant targets forced the United States and Israel to halt further strikes, preserving the core of Iranian retaliatory capacity.
Will a new military coalition try to neutralise the strait?
The analyst warns that, without a diplomatic settlement, a coalition could form with the explicit aim of removing Iran’s capacity to control Hormuz, an outcome he considers unacceptable to the United States and Gulf Arab states.
What is Iran’s main internal challenge?
Sinkaya points to domestic political and economic strains that have been aggravated by the war, even while the IRGC has consolidated its security role.
Does Israel retain a military edge?
Israel weakened Iran’s regional proxies and ended its foothold in Syria, yet it suffered visible damage to its missile-defence credibility and to its regional image, leaving it more exposed than before the conflict.
Can Turkey-Iran dialogue continue?
Despite mutual suspicions, Iranian diplomats still seek to keep lines of communication open with Ankara in the hope of limiting Turkish alignment with Washington and extracting modest economic or logistical advantages.
